Much speculation exists about the coup in Turkey on July 15, 2016. Some
even call it a “false-coup,” which President Recep Tayyip Erdogan organized
in order to justify a crackdown against oppositionists. There are many
other instances when a military tried to remove the civilian head of
government. Case studies suggest a pattern, which can be used to evaluate
the events in Turkey one year ago.
When conducting a coup, the first action involves capturing or killing the
head of government, in this instance Erdogan.
In parallel to killing or capturing the head of government, loyal military
and security units must be immobilized to prevent them from obstructing the
coup.
Public information is critical. The putschists typically seize control of
media so they can manage the flow of information to the public. Traditional
media outlets involve radio and television, both public and private. New
media include social media such as Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube.
A head of the putsch presents himself so the public can attach a face to
the events and find reassurance. If the public protests the coup, mutinous
soldiers use all necessary measures to preserve order.
The following occurred in Turkey:
Erdogan was vacationing in Marmaris on July 15. When mutinous soldiers
arrived at his hotel to arrest him, Erdogan had checked out and was on his
way to Dalaman airport.
The first inkling of the coup occurred in the early evening when mechanized
units used tanks to block the Bosphorus Bridge and the Fatih Sultan Mehmet
Bridge, crossing from the Asian side to the European side of Istanbul. Land
forces on the bridge were joined by the gendarmerie.
Prominent members of the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) were arrested. Chairman
of the General Staff General Hulusi Akar, and Deputy Chief of Staff Yasar
Guler were imprisoned at the Akincilar air base on the outskirts of Ankara.
Commander of the Land Forces General Salih Zeki Colak, Gendarmerie
Commander Galip Mendi, Commander of the Air Force General Abidin Unal, and
Commander of the Turkish Naval Forces Bulent Bostanoglu were also taken
into custody. Hakan Fidan, head of the National Intelligence Agency, was
rushed to a secure location.
TRT
, Turkey’s public television, was taken off the air. Soldiers also seized
control of CNN Turk, interrupting a live broadcast. No private
television channels were affected.
Erdogan disappeared during the coup. In the early hours of the morning, he
surfaced to address the nation using FaceTime. He called on followers to
take to the streets in defense of Turkey’s democracy.
Imams echoed Erdogan’s appeal. The chant “Allahu akbar” – God is great –
reverberated from the muezzins of mosques. Many thousands of supporters
went to Ataturk Airport and Taksim Square in Istanbul. They also gathered
outside the presidential palace in Ankara.
F-16s controlled by the putschists allegedly bombed the army headquarters
and the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA).
Though Turkey’s military has a reputation for efficiency, its actions were
poorly considered and badly executed. The coup fell far short of best
practices for military takeovers.
How could mutinous soldiers have been unaware of Erdogan’s plans to leave
the hotel? Failing to find him was a major gaff that undermined the coup
from the outset.
Why wasn’t Erdogan apprehended on his way to the airport before his
presidential plane took off? The coup plotters possessed F-16 fighter jets.
Why didn’t they intercept or shoot down Erdogan’s plane?
Members of the Turkish General Staff representing major branches of the
Turkish armed forces were detained. Was their arrest part of the coup
design or was it intended to prevent them from joining the ranks of
mutineers?
MIT’s Hakan Fidan, was not apprehended. Of all the members of Turkey’s
national security establishment, Fidan is closest to Erdogan and best
positioned to protect the president. Erdogan once called him his “sır
küpü,” which means ‘jar of secrets’.
The putschists never presented themselves to the public, explaining events
and offering reassurance.
Why did the coup plotters fail to take over major private networks that
most Turks actually watch? Both TRT and CNN Turk have
relatively small viewing audiences.
And why did the coup plotters allow social media to function? They could
have jammed coverage, but didn’t. It is ironic that Erdogan addressed the
nation using FaceTime, a form of social media he vowed to eliminate.
While imams called Erdogan’s supporters to the streets, the putschists
issued instructions for people to stay indoors. Allowing Erdogan supporters
free reign allowed a groundswell of popular support for the president.
Damage to the TGNA was minimal. Crater analysis suggested that explosives
inside the building were used, rather than high impact ordinance of fighter
jets.
According to US Secretary of State John Kerry, “It does not appear to be a
very brilliantly planned or executed event.” Kerry has a knack for
understatement. It was a botched coup that showed all the hallmarks of
incompetence.
Would Erdogan be so reckless to stage an event that endangered Turkish
citizens, killing 265 people? Another theory exists about Erdogan’s
complicity.
Rather than organize the coup, Erdogan was either tipped off by members of
the putsch or by the intelligence agency of a foreign government. Instead
of preventing the coup, Erdogan allowed events to progress just far enough
so claims of a coup were credible but not so far as to present any real
risk.
In his first public remarks during the early morning of July 16, Erdogan
issued a chilling threat: “This latest action is an act of treason. This
attempt, this move, is a great gift from God for us. Why? Because the move
will allow us to clean up the armed forces, which needs to be completely
cleaned.” In a rush to judgement, he vowed to purge all state institutions
of “the virus” spread by supporters of Fethullah Gülen.
The Turkish government had already prepared lists of oppositionists. The
authorities moved immediately to arrest them. To date, about 50,000
security officers and civil servants have been arrested and another 150,000
dismissed from their jobs. Approximately 150 journalists are in jail.
Members of parliament, judges, and educators have also been dismissed or
arrested. Instead of reconciliation, Erdogan arrested another 7,000 people
on the one-year anniversary. Erdogan vows to approve a bill reinstating the
death penalty if parliament proposed it.
Some say Erdogan is paranoid. But even paranoid people have enemies.
Erdogan was profoundly aware of potential challenges from the TSK. Turkey
has a history of military coups in 1960, 1971, 1980, and 1997. Erdogan was
directly affected by the coup of 1997, which outlawed the Refah Party to
which he belonged.
To pre-empt challenges, Erdogan pushed through constitutional reforms
affecting the Kemalist judiciary. Pro-government prosecutors conjured
fantastical plots, Ergenekon and Operation Sledgehammer, which were used to
crack-down on retired and current military officers. Arrests sent shock
waves through Turkey’s security establishment.
Events in Egypt further exacerbated Erdogan’s concerns. Erdogan identified
closely with Egypt’s President Mohamed Morsi as a kindred spirit and
fraternal political ally. Morsi was a leader of the Muslim Brotherhood and
a known Islamist. When Morsi was overthrown by General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi
in 2013, Erdogan feared something similar. He accused the West of
masterminding Morsi’s removal.
Erdogan was pro-active to prevent a similar fate. Erdogan’s purge is called
a “civilian coup” or a “controlled coup,” because it pervasively eliminated
opposition and generated widespread fear in society and professional ranks.
An open-ended state of emergency has been used by Erdogan to eliminate the
rule of law and systematize repression.
Secrets are hard to keep. Repression is difficult to maintain. Close to two
million people rallied in the Maltepe district of Istanbul on July 8. They
demand “adalet” — justice and the rule of law. They want answers.
When Erdogan eventually leaves power, Turks and the world will learn what
really happened. The truth will come out.
Mr. Phillips is Director of the Program on Peace-building and Rights at
Columbia University’s Institute for the Study of Human Rights. He worked on
Turkish issues as a senior adviser and foreign affairs expert to the U.S.
State Department’s Bureau of European Affairs under President Clinton and
Bush. His recent book is titled An Uncertain Ally: Turkey Under Erdogan’s Dictatorship.
This article has first been published in the special issue of the Fountain Magazine © Blue Dome Press